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Abstract
After four years of implementation the EU funds for candidate countries, the Instrument for Pre-
Accession Assistance (IPA), has shown a mixed performance, resulting in a statistically limited level 
of use of IPA funds in most target countries, though with some variance. This article intends to test 
the hypothesis linking such a differentiation with the presence or absence of the official status of 
candidate country. The analysis of the funds allocation levels, the funds absorption levels and the 
progress in administrative reforms nevertheless shows that candidacy status is neither a sufficient 
nor a necessary condition for a good IPA performance. Rather, the data show that the IPA funds 
were able to catalyse a good progress only in those target countries characterised by an average 
adaptation pressure, but not to spur laggards and frontrunners, recalling the hypothesis put forward 
by Radaelli in his analysis of the outcomes of Europeanisation. 
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Introduction
The paper intends to give a mid-term assessment of the achievements of the 
Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA). Pre-accession assistance, in 
the form of EU funds for candidate countries, is part and parcel of a process 
aimed at fostering institutional and policy change, with the final aim of 
accelerating EU membership. The IPA Regulation replaces all previous 
instruments for both official candidate and potential candidate countries, 
while differentiating them on their access to assistance components 
and funds management decentralisation. The IPA aims at improving the 
governance structures and at strengthening administrative capacities, 
in order to prepare the candidate countries to the administrative tasks 
implied in being an EU member state. I operationalise its performance 
through three indicators: the levels of funds allocation, funds absorption, 
and administrative reform. 
Firstly, I compare the levels of financial assistance per country both in 
absolute terms, and in relative (per capita) terms. Secondly, drawing from 
the Financial Transparency System of the European Commission, I present 
the amount of funds awarded to the beneficiary countries according to: 
(a) the country of the beneficiary, (b) the location of the action, and (c) 
a combination of the two, pointing to the absorption capacity of local 
agencies. Thirdly, I check the development of administrative capacities 
in target countries through the progress in establishing a Decentralised 
Implementation System (DIS). Such a reform is instrumental in allowing 
national governments to achieve accreditation by the European 
Commission for decentralised management and to gain access to all 
available budget lines under the IPA. Through the analysis of the IPA 
Progress Reports for 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 it is possible to identify 
the main trends. The DIS accreditation process proceeds separately for 
each country and IPA component through six stages, resulting in a highly 
differentiated pattern. 
Preliminary findings show that the allocation levels are path-dependent; 
absorption levels wary widely, and may be linked with local administrative 
capacities. Finally, at mid-term, the IPA has pushed some countries 
to develop decentralised management of EU funds. Progress has 
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nevertheless proven particularly difficult in the most laggard territories 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo), highlighting that in such cases 
the IPA lacks force to push for deep internal reforms. The challenge for 
the next budgetary period for the IPA will be to identify and address the 
factors hindering funds absorption and decentralised management in the 
laggard territories too. Likely, additional incentives will be needed for this 
scope. 
The financial instrument of EU pre-accession 
assistance
Pre-accession assistance, in the form of EU funds for candidate countries, 
is part and parcel of a process aimed at fostering institutional and policy 
change, with the final aim of accelerating EU membership. The current 
framework for relations between the EU and its candidate countries in 
the Western Balkans (WB)1 is the Stabilisation and Association Process 
(SAP), launched in 2003, based on contractual relations (Stabilisation and 
Association Agreements, SAA) and financial aid through the Instrument 
for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA). The IPA Regulation 718/20072 provides 
an overall structure to pre-accession financial assistance for both official 
candidate3 and potential candidate countries,4 while introducing a 
differentiation in the assistance components between the two categories. 
While candidate countries have access to all IPA budget lines, including 
the ones mimicking the most closely the EU structural funds (regional 
development, agriculture, human resources), potential candidate countries 
may only accede to the first two, aimed at institution-building and regional 
1 “Western Balkans” is a referent including those South East European countries which are candidate or potential 
candidate to EU accession in the 2007/2014 timeframe. It refers to all former Yugoslav countries, minus Slovenia, 
plus Albania. Besides the Western Balkans, the IPA financial instrument applies also to Turkey and Iceland; they are 
altogether indicated in European Commission documents as “target” or “beneficiary” countries.
2 Commission Regulation (EC) No 718/2007 of 12 June 2007 implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 
1085/2006 establishing an instrument for pre-accession assistance (IPA) (OJ L 170, 29.6.2007, p. 1), as 
amended by Commission Regulation (EU) No 80/2010 of 28 January 2010 (OJ L 25, 29.1.2010, p.1).
3 Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (hereinafter: Macedonia), Montenegro (since 2010), Serbia 
(since 2012), Turkey, and Iceland.
4 Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro (until 2010), Serbia (until 2012), and Kosovo (without prejudice to 
positions on status, and in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence).
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cooperation. Moreover, while decentralised management is a stricter 
requirement for candidate countries, potential candidates may continue 
spending EU funds through centralised EU Commission management. 
The structure of the IPA funds is “designed to mirror the Structural Funds” of 
the EU5 and they have to be managed accordingly. Their aim is to provide 
candidate countries with a training mechanism to set up administrative 
capacities and learn how to deal appropriately with cohesion and 
structural funds after EU accession. The focus of the IPA is therefore on 
institution building and on compliance with the acquis, in a full accession-
driven perspective. The management system is more structured, although 
still flexible; it provides for a roadmap towards the establishment of the 
Decentralised Implementation System in each administration, final 
objective for all target countries.6






























5 Rural Development decentralized þ ý
CAP / Rural Devt 
Fund
Source: Denti, op. cit., p. 32.
Cohesion policy and pre-accession aid can be understood through the 
prism of Europeanization and neo-institutionalism, as they require target 
states to evolve into “compound polities”7 by developing multi-level 
governance structures, according to the principles of decentralization, 
partnership and programming. The IPA mixes characteristics only partially 
5  Allan F. Tatham (2009), Enlargement of the European Union, Alphen aan de Rijn: Kluwer Law International, p. 323.
6  Ibid. 
7 Vivien A. Schmidt (2006), Democracy in Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press, cited by Bache (2010), 
“Europeanization and multi-level governance: EU cohesion policy and pre-accession aid in Southeast Europe”, 
Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 10, No. 1, p. 1.
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present in the previous pre-accession funds, to introduce the three 
principles, already contextually present only in the EU structural funds. In 
doing so, the IPA “deliberately mimic cohesion policy requirements to 
prepare candidate countries more effectively for managing cohesion 
policy post-accession”.8 
Table 2 - Evolution of structural principles of pre-accession instruments 
over time
period Instruments Decentralization Partnership Programming
1985-1992 IMPs (Greece) ý þ þ
1989-present Structural funds þ þ þ
1994-present Cohesion funds ý þ ý
1990-2006 Pre-accession instr. þ ý ý
1996-2001 MEDA (Turkey) ý þ þ
2007-present IPA funds þ þ þ
Structural funds: ERDF, ESF, EAGGF 
Pre-accession instruments: PHARE, OBNOVA, SAPARD, ISPA, EDIS, CARDS + PAI Turkey 
Source: Author’s re-elaboration from Bache, op. cit., p. 8.
The IPA aims at improving the governance structures and at strengthening 
administrative capacities, in order to prepare the candidate countries to 
the administrative tasks implied in being an EU member state. It is therefore 
possible to identify the different explanatory variables by pragmatically 
applying some concepts offered by the literature on Europeanisation. 
Scholars have focused on three perspectives on the causal mechanisms 
of Europeanisation, 9 under a ‘neo-institutionalist umbrella’,10 summarised 
in Table 3. All the three are relevant to explain the performance of the IPA 
funds. In fact, rather than offering exclusive and competing approaches, 
they help to build a comprehensive theoretical framework. 11
8 Ian Bache, op. cit., p.7.
9 Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, eds. (2004), The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe, 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
10 Paolo Graziano and Maarten Peter Vink, Europeanization: New Research Agendas, Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, pp. 12-13.
11  Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse (2003), “Conceptualizing Domestic Impact of Europe”, in: Kevin Featherstone and 
Claudio Radaelli, The Politics of Europeanization, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 55-78.
Vol.XV
III, N
o. 66 - 2012
XIX (68) - 2013
66
Table 3 – Theoretical perspectives on the causal mechanisms of 
Europeanisation
Logic 
Interests of the 
actors





(same goals, new 
strategies)
“Europeanization results from a distribution of power resources 
between actors in the domestic arena





(new goals, new 
strategies)
“Network governance provides the potential for a deeper 
transformation of actor behaviour and preferences”. Regular 
interaction can generate trust through socialisation, promoting 





evolving over time timing and practices
Europeanisation derives from incremental change plus critical 
junctures.
Source: Author’s elaboration (op. cit., p. 35). Quotes from Bache (op. cit., p. 3)
Since Europeanisation is understood as a two-way process, in order to 
define the explanatory variables it is important to consider not only the 
EU level, but also the domestic level. 12 To analyse the IPA, both levels 
are important, in order to take into account both the structure of the 
instrument and the recipient countries’ specific features. The main key 
conditions underlined in the relevant literature are summarized in Table 4.
12 Helen Wallace (2000), “EU Enlargement: a Neglected Subject”, in Maria Green Cowles and Michael Smith 
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2- other international 
factors
A comparison of the different EU financial assistance instruments for the 
Western Balkans in their chronological succession is presented in the table 
below. The geographical focus of the EU’s action appears widening; the 
focus moves from reconstruction to development to pre-accession, and 
the regional programmes acquire more and more importance over time.13







Instrument PHARE OBNOVA ECHO CARDS IPA





















1.184 bln € 1.476 bln € 2.196 bln €
5.385 bln € 5.189,5 bln € 
TOT 1990-2000: 4.856 bln €
















4% -- 6% 4% 8%
13  Davide Denti, op. cit., p. 33
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Source: Denti, op. cit., p. 33.
Candidate status differentiation and performance of 
pre-accession funds
The issue of differentiation has been called into attention by the European 
Stability Initiative (ESI) in a 2005 a priori analysis of the draft IPA regulation.14 
According to the ESI, the IPA was an “essentially passive” strategy towards 
the region, aiming only at providing, at best, the same amounts and the 
same quality of the previous CARDS funds, whose experience and impact 
were deemed “disappointing” and “very limited”. A differentiation in the 
IPA approach might therefore have carried heavy risks, first of all the one 
of a ‘double bluff’ in which, in the absence of relevant incentives, the 
EU would pretend to offer membership while candidate countries would 
pretend to reform, resulting in a delaying tactic postponing final accession 
perspectives beyond 2020 and eroding the EU’s influence in the region. The 
correction put forward by the ESI included the need to link assistance to the 
signature of SAAs rather than to candidate status, following the example of 
the strategy towards Bulgaria, that had achieved a “dramatic policy and 
institutional change” by opening up all pre-accession instruments to the 
country even in absence of an official candidacy.
The call of the ESI was taken up again in 2008 by Tamás Szemlér in his 
analysis of the appropriateness of the IPA to the political situation and 
to the development needs of the Western Balkans.15 Szemlér remarked 
in particular the lack, in the context of the Western Balkans, of the three 
merits of the ‘regatta approach’ for Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
countries, namely incentives for reform, adequate assistance, and credible 
commitment. He therefore suggested opening up the regatta between 
all official and potential candidate countries, in order to give incentives 
for reforms and enhance the credibility of accession perspectives.
14 European Stability Initiative - ESI (2005), Breaking out of the Balkan Ghetto: Why IPA should be changed, Berlin, 
pp. 1-12, available at http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/ esi_document_id_66.pdf.
15 Tamás Szemlér (2008), “EU Financial Support for the Western-Balkans: Well-Suited to Real Needs?”, in Using 
IPA And Other EU Funds To Accelerate Convergence And Integration In The Western-Balkans, Budapest: Central 
European University-ENS, available at web.ceu.hu/cens/assets/files/IPA.pdf.
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The present paper intends to answer the question if the differentiation 
among target countries, based on candidacy status, had a relevant impact 
on the performance of the EU pre-accession funds in the Western Balkans. 
As such, it aims to verify or confute the claim of the ESI and of Szemlér.
In fact, the current structure of the IPA tries to square the circle of 
the dilemma of fairness: how to treat equally countries that are at 
substantially different pre-accession stages? With this aim, it provides an 
overall regional approach, while preserving differentiation in the access 
to its components and in their management strategies. To ensure that 
differentiation does not end up into ghettoisation, it provides for two 
important correctives: first, the amount of funds available (while higher in 
absolute terms) remains roughly the same for all WB territories once taken 
into consideration population and development needs; second, the 
reform process towards decentralised management is set to start for both 
categories of candidates, though incentives may be stronger for official 
candidate countries.
The research takes a causal research design, with a comparative 
approach to the mid-term outcomes of IPA. It compares the various target 
countries in the Western Balkans and evaluate whether the various levels 
of performance of IPA (variance in funds allocation, funds absorption, or 
administrative reform) are correlated with the candidacy status of the 
target countries. 
The aim of the IPA funds is to improve the governance structures and 
to strengthen administrative capacities. Several criteria may be taken in 
consideration in order to draw a preliminary assessment of their efficiency. 
I operationalise their performance through three indicators: the levels of 
(a) funds allocation, (b) funds absorption, and (c) administrative reform. 
Firstly, I compare the levels of financial assistance per country both in 
absolute terms, and in relative (per capita) terms. Secondly, drawing from 
the Financial Transparency System of the European Commission, I present 
the amount of funds awarded to the beneficiary countries according to: 
(a) the country of the beneficiary, (b) the location of the action, and (c) 
a combination of the two, pointing to the absorption capacity of local 
agencies. Thirdly, I check the development of administrative capacities 
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in target countries through the progress in establishing a Decentralised 
Implementation System (DIS). Such a reform is instrumental in allowing 
national governments to achieve accreditation for decentralised 
management and to gain access to all available budget lines under the 
IPA. Through the analysis of the IPA Progress Reports for 2008, 2009, and 2010, 
it is possible to identify the main trends in the progress of DIS establishment.
Funds allocations, per country
The allocation of funds for each IPA component and for each beneficiary 
country is defined in the Multiannual Indicative Financial Framework 
(MIFF), which reflects the political priorities identified by the European 
Commission in annex to its three-yearly Enlargement Strategy.16 The total 
allocations under IPA for the Western Balkan countries reach a level of 6,7 
bln €, thus exceeding the amount of 5,1 bln € under CARDS.17 This allows 
us to dispel the claim that a reduction in overall assistance levels reflects 
the backslide of enlargement among EU priorities and constitutes a priori 
an accession-delaying tactic. 
A first indicator to consider is the absolute level of financial assistance per 
country, as reported in the MIFF 2008-201218 visualised in the following map 
in clusters according to assistance levels. These clusters do not appear 
to be correlated to the candidate status of each country, as the three 
candidate countries are in three different groupings. 
16 European Commission, COM(2008) 705 final of 5 November 2008 - Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance 
(IPA) - Multiannual indicative financial framework for 2010-2012.
17 Robert Sierhej (2007), “EU funds: what can the Western Balkans learn from the New Member States (NMS)?”, 
presentation, Warsaw : International Monetary Fund regional office, October 2007.
18 Detailed data are included in the Annexes.
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Map 1 - Total allocations per beneficiary countries, 2007-2013 (mln €)
Allocations Countries / Territories












Source: author’s elaboration on data from COM(2009) 543 final and COM(2008) 705 final
The levels of assistance can be better compared when equalised in terms 
of population; the results are again visualised in the map below in clusters 
according to per capita yearly assistance levels.


















Source: author’s elaboration on data from COM(2009)543 final and COM(2008)705 final; 
population data for 2011.
The levels of per capita allocation show a high variance, as the amounts 
for Montenegro exceed the double of those for Bosnia. Candidate 
countries are in the upper and intermediate groupings, making it possible 
to suggest that candidate status may play a role in the definition of 
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per capita funds allocations. Anyway, the presence in the same upper 
grouping of Kosovo, which is far away from candidate status, should 
make us wary of intervenient variables (e.g. fixed costs of new national 
administrations, expensive consociational agreements, and post-conflict 
rebuilding efforts). Candidacy status may at best be a sufficient condition 
for a higher than average level of per capita pre-accession assistance, 
but not a necessary one. 
Funds absorption, per country
In the framework of the EU budget and finances, the funds absorption 
capacity has been defined as “the extent to which a state (member or 
non-member) is able to spend the allocated financial resources fully and 
in an effective and efficient way”. 19 Funds absorption represent an issue 
to be tackled, as the achievement of cohesion targets largely depends 
on timely and effective spending of the available amounts of funds. 
Underspending is highly deprecated, as it results in the need to send the 
money back to Brussels, and it might influence future funding levels. 20 
A set of data on the absorption levels of IPA funds in the Western Balkan 
countries can be extracted from the Financial Transparency System (FTS) 
database of the European Commission, 21 in order to draft a preliminary 
evaluation of the absorption levels. Such data can be exported: (a) 
per country/territory, based on the address given by the beneficiary 
in the identification documents submitted to the Commission; (b) per 
geographical zone, referring to the location of the action financed by 
the grant; (c) per both criteria at the same time. In all the three cases, the 
amount corresponds to the total awarded to carry out the contracted 
activities, and not to the actual payments for the year. 
19 Mojmir Mrak and Dragan Tilev (2008), Absorption for EU pre-accession funds: concept and implications for 
Kosovo, Pristina, Forumi2015-KCSF, April 2008, p.30.
20 Gerbrand Van Bork (2011), Introduction to Cohesion Policy, IPA, and Project Cycle Management, Ecorys PCM 
Training, Ankara, 1-11 February 2011.
21 Europa.eu, Financial Transparency System, http://ec.europa.eu/beneficiaries/fts/index_en.htm. The data have 
been exported in June 2013.
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When analysed in relation to the address of the implementing agency, 
the data show a prevalence of expenditures per capita in Serbia, 
Montenegro, and Kosovo (all above the 8€/pc/y threshold). A lower 
cluster of countries is composed of Macedonia and Croatia (below 4 €/
pc/y). Bosnia and Albania stand in the middle. No effect of the countries’ 
candidacy status appears from the data. 
Data per capita in relation to the location of the contracted activities 
show a peak in the case of Kosovo (beyond 55€/pc/y), followed by 
Montenegro, Serbia and Albania. Bosnia and Macedonia’s values are the 
lowest, below 20€/pc/y, not reaching the minimum threshold identified 
in 23€ per capita per year. The region’s overall average of 23,43€/pc/y 
is anyway in line with the threshold.22 The data for Croatia is particularly 
striking, since the country scores close to zero levels of fund awarded 
per person per year. This may be related to the choice of few, big 
infrastructural projects, whose enactment is taking time, and which are 
thus not yet included in the database. All in all, for this indicator as well, 
no correlation appears between the countries’ candidate status and the 
level of funds awarded. 
When the two criteria exposed above are applied together, as in an 
intersection, the data extracted show a lower absolute value (496 mln 
€, slightly less than 30% of the total). This amount reflects the value of the 
agreements contracted with local implementing parties for actions on the 
territory of the Western Balkans. In this case, the highest per capita values 
are expressed by Kosovo and Serbia, while values close to zero appear 
for Croatia. 23 No relation with the candidate status of pre-accession 
countries may be noticed from the data even here.
22 A second MIFF for the period 2010-2012 has been approved on 5 November 2008, identifying the 2008 
allocations based on per capita past expenditures, with a minimal threshold of 23 - per person [COM(2008) 705 
final].
23 The shadow of the European Reconstruction Agency (EAR) is also not apparent from the data: the territories where 
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Maps 3 – IPA awarded funds, per country/territory (beneficiary’s address), 
in € per capita per year (2007/12)
Figure 1 – as above
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Maps 4 – IPA awarded funds, per geographical zone (location of the 
action) in € per capita per year (2009/12)
Figure 2 – as above
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Maps 5 – IPA awarded funds, per location of the action and beneficiary’s 
address in € per capita per year (2009/12)
Figure 3 – as above
Source: author’s elaboration on data from the EC Financial Transparency System; population data for 2011. 
Figures 2 and 3 are relative to the 2009/12 period, since there were no awarded funds in 2007 and 2008. 
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Management decentralisation, per country
The implementation and programming of IPA funds may begin with 
centralised management, at least for the assistance components I and 
II for potential candidate countries. Nevertheless, the final aim and 
condition for full availability of all five budget lines is the development of 
the administrative capacities by the national beneficiary governments, 
in compliance with Art. 10 of the IPA Regulation 718/2007, to cover at 
least tendering, contracting and payments. The component V of IPA 
assistance can only be implemented in a fully decentralised way from the 
beginning, without ex ante controls. The Decentralised Implementation 
System (DIS) of each national administration should achieve “conferral 
of management” (accreditation) by the European Commission before 
the competencies of the EU Delegations and of the Commission may be 
transferred to the beneficiary government. 24
The roadmap for the accreditation of the DIS includes six different stages, 
numbered from 0 to 5. Such steps range from establishing the administrative 
structure, with the definition of tasks, appointment of the key actors, and 
provision of adequate staffing and equipment, until the final verification 
audit by the Commission, which leads to the conferral of management 
powers and the signature of a Financing Agreement between the EC 
and the state administration. The intermediate steps request the national 
administrations to: (a) identify the gap between the local procedures 
and the DIS requirements, through a Gap Assessment Report; (b) take 
actions in order to fill the gaps, following an Action Plan for Gap Plugging; 
(c) assess the effective compliance trough a Compliance Assessment 
Report; and (d) obtain the accreditation from the European Commission.
24  Mrak and Tilev, op. cit., pp. 21-22. 
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Table 6 - Roadmap for DIS accreditation





Appointment of key actors
Adequate staffing and 
equipment




Action Plan for Gap Plugging 







Stage 4 Accreditation NAO
National accreditation and 
submission of application for 
conferral of management 
powers with ex ante control
Stage 5 Verification audit EC
Conferral of management 
powers
Signature of Financing 
Agreement
* The key actors involved in managing and implementing the IPA funds, as foreseen in the DIS, other than the 
European Commission (EC), are: the National IPA Coordinator (NIPAC); the Strategic Coordinator for 
Components III and IV (SCO); the Competent Accrediting Officer (CAO); the National Authorising Officer 
(NAO); the National Fund (NF); the Operating Structure (OS), with a Central Financial and Contracting Unit 
(CFCU); and the Audit Authority (AA).
The implementation of the DIS roadmap proceeds separately for each WB country 
and for each IPA component, resulting in a highly differentiated pattern of progress.
The progress of the different Western Balkan countries on the roadmap towards 
decentralised management of the IPA funds may provide us with a measure 
of mid-term performance of the IPA in its objective of fostering reform and 
strengthening administrative capacities in pre-accession countries. The presence of 
clear benchmarks, defined by the formalised stages of the DIS roadmap, allows us 
to draw some conclusions based on quantitative data, and to compare them with 
the test hypothesis linking IPA performance with the countries’ EU candidacy status. 
When taking a look at the picture of the progress in the decentralisation of management 
of IPA funds in the 2008-2011 period, it is possible to underline some trends.25
25 Data are extracted from the yearly Commission report on IPA funds (COM(2008)850, COM(2009)699, 
COM(2010)687, COM(2011)647, COM(2012)678). In its last reports for the years 2010 and 2011, the 
Commission has stopped detailing explicitly the country progress in terms of DIS stages per component, especially 
in the case of Albania, Montenegro and Macedonia. Data for such countries are thus the author’s interpretation 
of the Commission’s lexicon. Moreover, Serbia and Albania started working on DIS for components III to V even 
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Figure 4      
Figure 5
Table 7 - Average stage of DIS implementation (0 to 5)
2008 2009 2010 2011
Croatia 4,8 4,8 5,0 5,0
Bosnia-
Herzegovina
0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Serbia 1,0 2,0 2,0 2,4
Montenegro 0,0 1,0 2,0 2,0
Kosovo 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Macedonia 2,0 3,8 4,0 3,8
Albania 0,0 0,5 2,0 2,3
For candidate countries: comp. I to V; for potential candidates: I to II.
before the granting of the formal candidate status
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Figure 6
Croatia remains the highest scoring country in DIS roadmap throughout the 
period, already starting from a very good position; nevertheless, it could 
achieve stage 5 also for the component V only in 2010. Among the other 
countries, while up to 2009 Macedonia and Serbia were the frontrunners, 
Belgrade is afterwards caught up by Montenegro and Albania. Serbia 
does not see any progress in 2010, while Montenegro stalls in 2011 and is 
overcome by Serbia and Albania. Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina 
do not mark any substantial progress whatsoever, remaining at the very 
early stages for four years in a row.
Although both Croatia and Macedonia hold good levels in the scoreboard, 
the case of Montenegro highlights how the status of EU candidate country 
does not appear to be a sufficient condition to foster progress on the 
DIS roadmap. This may have to do with a time variable: the effects of 
candidacy are not immediate, as it may take some time for a candidate 
country, especially in the case of small administrations, to set up the 
competent structures for the new IPA components III to V. The upgrade to 
candidate country of Montenegro in 2009 did not bring about substantial 
DIS progresses in 2010. The candidacy status does not either seem to be 
a necessary condition to achieve a good progress on the DIS roadmap. 
This is shown by the parallel paths of Albania and Montenegro, running 
contrary to the expectations according to the candidacy hypothesis.
At mid-term, the IPA has pushed some candidate countries to develop 
administrative structures able to sustain a Decentralised Implementation 
System, a necessary step towards the use of IPA funds, from the perspective 
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of future implementation of EU regional and cohesion funds. On the 
other hand, such developments have had variable records from country 
to country. The process of management decentralisation is likely to be 
brought around conclusions by 2014 in most of the countries of the region, 
with the exception of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo. Progress 
in management decentralisation proved particularly difficult in these 
territories, which are also lagging behind in the EU integration process. 
In such cases, the IPA lacks enough force to constitute an incentive for 
deep internal reform. 
The challenge for the new post-2014 IPA-II will be to foster decentralised 
management in the laggard territories too, in order to foster capacity-
building of national administration. Likely, additional incentives will be 
needed for this scope. 26
Summary of the findings
Throughout the paper, the IPA funds have been analysed in terms of 
their allocations, their absorption levels, and their capacity of fostering 
administrative reform to achieve decentralised management, in order to 
check if the candidacy status of pre-accession countries mattered as an 
explanatory variable of their performance levels.
The allocation levels have been shown consistent with the previous 
financial instruments and not correlated with the status of candidate 
country. Globally, the risks highlighted by ESI and by Szémler concerning 
a differentiation between candidate and potential candidate countries 
about allocation levels are dispelled by the official data from the MIFF.
The absorption levels have been controlled through data collected from 
the Financial Transparency System of the European Commission. Up to 2010 
26 Blockmans suggested as “flanking policies” the development of visa facilitation schemes and the inclusion of the 
Western Balkans countries in EU programmes such as Erasmus. Since all the countries of the region have achieved 
visa-free regime by 2010, it is even more necessary today to think about other flanking policies that may constitute a 
positive incentive for reform in the next years. Steven Blockmans (2007), Tough Love. The European Union’s relation 
with the Western Balkans, The Hague: T.M.C. Asser, pp. 313-316.
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included, the highest absorption levels per capita have been recorded 
in Kosovo and Serbia. Serbia is also the territory in which the highest share 
of funds goes to national implementing agencies rather than to foreign 
consultancies. Concerning absorption levels, the candidate status of a 
country does not appear to be either a sufficient or a necessary condition.
Finally, the progress in management decentralisation up to 2010 highlights 
the differentiated pattern of pre-accession development in the Western 
Balkans. As two candidate countries over three (Croatia and Macedonia) 
score good results, candidacy may be a sufficient condition for progress 
in management decentralisation, but only after some time (as highlighted 
by the case of Montenegro); anyway, it remains not a necessary condition 
(as shown by the comparatively good results of Serbia and Albania).
Table 8 - Candidacy status as a condition of efficiency of pre-accession 
assistance in the Western Balkans
Allocations Absorption Management
Sufficient? YES ? NO YES ?
Necessary? NO NO NO
Conclusions
After two years of implementation, the IPA has shown a mixed performance, 
resulting in a statistically limited level of use of IPA funds in most target 
countries, though with some variance.27 A first hypothesis on the reasons 
of such a differentiation has been pointing at the candidate status of 
target countries as the explanatory variable.28 Such an hypothesis proved 
nevertheless not to be supported by quantitative data: an analysis on 
the funds allocation levels, the funds absorption levels and the progress 
in administrative reforms, based on the European Commission’s Financial 
Transparency System database and the IPA Progress Reports has shown 
27 Silvana Mojsovska (2010), “Western Balkans’ accession to the EU: a need for (re)tailoring of the EU assistance 
instruments”, Europesworld.org.
28  ESI, op. cit.; Szemlér, op. cit.
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that candidacy status is not a sufficient neither a necessary condition for a 
good IPA performance. Rather, the data show that the IPA funds were able 
to catalyse a good progress only in those target countries characterised 
by an average adaptation pressure, but not to spur laggards and 
frontrunners, recalling the hypothesis put forward by Radaelli in his analysis 
of the outcomes of Europeanisation: convergence will happen in cases 
of intermediate misfit, while divergence or inertia will be more likely where 
local structures are either already established and compatible (low misfit) 
or too different to allow for feasible reforms (high misfit).29 
Further research will be needed to identify the explanatory factors of such 
mixed and differentiated outcomes. When taking into account vectors of 
Europeanisation in the Western Balkans, one dimension should be added to 
the theoretical framework deriving from the research on “Europeanisation 
East” (Heritier 2005) and the impact of the EU on candidate states in 
Central and Eastern Europe. Western Balkan countries differ from their 
Central European counterparts in the stronger relevance of “hindering 
historical legacies” and “limited statehood” (Elbasani 2013:9). 
First, special attention should be devoted to the domestic factors under 
an historical institutionalist perspective (“hindering historical legacies”), 
as the subject is still under-researched. A logic of path dependency 
highlights the role of inertia and of the level of consolidation of the 
domestic situation, since current institutions, shaped by legacies of the 
past, are resistant to change.30 Schimmelfennig underlines the salience of 
specific legacies of conflict in the Western Balkans, identifying three sub-
factors of change: (a) an ‘endgame’ situation, with short-term, certain 
and relevant prospects of reward and sanction; (b) non-prohibitive costs 
for the incumbent governments; and (c) adequate levels of identification 
with the EU.31 Mink and Bonnard consider that the legacies of conflict 
remain present in the collective memory of public opinions, as stocks of 
memorial materials that can be reactivated by political entrepreneurs 
aiming at exploiting their legitimacy effect in the political arena.32 The 
29 Claudio Radaelli (2000), “Whither Europeanization? Concept stretching and substantive change”, European 
Integration online Papers, Vol. 4, No. 8, 2000, available at http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-008a.htm.
30 Simon Bulmer (2007), “Theorizing Europeanization”, in: Paolo Graziano and Maarten Peter Vink, op. cit., p. 50.
31 Frank Schimmelfennig (2008), “EU political accession conditionality after the 2004 enlargement: consistency and 
effectiveness”, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 15, No. 6, pp. 927-932.
32 Georges Mink and Pascal Bonnard (2010), Le passé au Présent. Gisements Mémoriels et Actions Publiques en 
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factors influencing the domestic cost of compliance in post-conflict 
situations may therefore be summarised with the presence of: (a) legacies 
of conflict, available for reactivation in the dynamic collective memory; 
(b) political entrepreneurs willing to adopt historicising strategies; and (c) 
political arenas where such strategies can be enacted and capitalised. 
Following the “domestic turn” in Europeanisation studies, an analysis of 
the administrative structures in each IPA country (in both the organisation 
of the offices and their staffing – resources, educational background and 
experience) may allow an understanding of the root causes of the pattern 
of differentiated progress in both absorption capacity and management 
decentralisation.33 
Secondly, weak statehood is highlighted in most recent studies as the 
most relevant intervening variable to explain the lack of both capacity 
and will to reform in target states, even when EU conditionality is 
present and clear.34 When compared to the results highlighted in figure 
6, weak statehood may be seen as one factor affecting the countries’ 
performance in establishing decentralised management of EU funds.35 
Consolidated statehood seems to be a precondition for Europeanisation, 
since its absence also makes the EU’s conditionality more inconsistent.36 
Unfinished processes of state-building leave the EU at odd in a position 
of state-builder for which it has no experience and adequate tools. The 
European Union should thus find a way to cope with such a situation, 
positing itself “neither [as] a model, nor [as] a hegemon”,37 but rather 
fostering the build-up of a viable institutional structures in candidate 
countries while respecting diversity and local solutions, in a process of 
member-state building rather than state-building alone.
Europe Centrale et Orientale, Paris: Michel Houdiard
33 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for this insight. 
34 Tanja Börzel (2013) ‘When Europeanization hits limited statehood: the Western Balkans as a test case for the 
transformative power of Europe, in Elbasani A. (ed) European Integration and Transformation in the Western 
Balkans. Europeanization or Business as Usual?. London: Routledge, pp. 173-184.
35 Cf. figure 11.1 in Börzel (2013), op. cit., p. 180
36 Börzel (2013), op. cit., p. 182.
37 Sylvie Ramel (2011) ‘The Role of the European Union in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Neither a Model, nor a Hegemon?’, 
Transitions, Vol. 51, pp. 269-287
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Annexes
Table 1 - Allocations per country over time, in mln € (MIFF 2008-2010 and 
2010-2012)
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total
Croatia 141,23 146,00 151,20 154,20 157,20 160,40 163,40 1073,63
Bosnia-Herz. 62,10 74,80 89,10 106,00 108,10 110,20 111,20 661,50
Serbia 189,70 190,90 194,80 198,70 202,70 206,80 207,80 1391,40
Montenegro 31,40 32,60 33,30 34,00 34,70 35,70 36,50 238,20
Kosovo 63,30 184,70 106,10 67,30 68,70 70,00 71,20 631,30
Albania 61,00 70,70 81,20 93,20 95,00 96,90 97,60 595,60
Macedonia 58,50 70,20 81,80 92,30 98,70 105,80 108,10 615,40
Total WB 607,23 769,90 737,50 754,70 765,10 785,80 795,80 5216,03
Sources: COM(2009) 543 final; COM(2008) 705 final
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Table 2 - Average levels of financial assistance, in € per capita per year
 Total (mln €) Population (2011) Average (€/pc/y)
Total WB 5.207,03 22.551.142 32,99
Montenegro 238,20 625.266 54,42
Kosovo 631,30 1.733.872 52,01
Macedonia 615,40 2.058.539 42,71
Croatia 1.073,63 4.284.889 35,79
Serbia 1.391,40 7.186.862 27,66
Albania 595,60 2.821.977 30,15
Bosnia-Herz. 661,50 3.839.737 24,61
Sources: author’s elaboration from official sources; population data for Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia in 2011 are estimates (North Kosovo 
not included).
Table 3 - IPA awarded funds, per country/territory (beneficiary’s address), in €




Croatia 4.253.389,69 2.915.682,84 6.430.524,87 26.601.513,41 5.228.227,59 5.883.445,00  2,00
Bosnia-Herz. 16.927.026,66 35.700.941,18 21.075.618,67 28.316.476,18 18.756.582,77 36.577.109,00  6,83
Serbia 945.654,73 49.822.418,40 118.034.231,28 54.881.329,81 77.484.762,77 56.807.371,00  8,30
Montenegro 0,00 661.424,15 3.022.616,09 13.908.317,46 4.881.077,08 7.577.906,00  8,01
Kosovo 0,00 16.456.254,83 11.870.755,17 20.064.618,68 20.938.042,72 14.936.075,00  8,10
Albania 17.489.516,86 10.223.045,08 11.707.153,25 18.165.682,68 19.953.410,69 19.654.671,00  5,74
Macedonia 670.628,25 6.789.569,06 7.273.794,72 12.701.871,51 4.572.039,69 8.972.063,00  3,32
Average 6,04
Source: author’s elaboration from European Commission, Financial Transparency Service database
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Table 4 - IPA awarded funds, per geographical zone (location of the 
action), in €
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Per capita
per year
Croatia 0,00 0,00 1.086.781,00 631.447,28 239.195,50 895.067,00  0,17
Bosnia-
Herz.
0,00 0,00 42.409.555,95 66.265.730,54 33.441.102,66 75.166.964,00  14,15
Serbia 0,00 0,00 209.253.191,71 186.426.841,68 188.309.794,92 142.565.029,00  25,27
Montenegro 0,00 0,00 25.645.689,15 24.451.024,92 24.366.449,75 17.559.180,00  36,79
Kosovo 0,00 0,00 117.282.070,47 90.335.581,94 93.150.877,93 84.494.857,00  55,55
Albania 0,00 0,00 54.557.117,34 91.097.063,42 83.842.063,86 54.392.802,00  25,15
Macedonia 0,00 0,00 13.065.997,47 27.316.173,45 12.403.292,78 4.059.277,00  6,90
Average  23,43
Source: author’s elaboration from European Commission, Financial Transparency Service database
Table 5 - IPA awarded funds, per location of the action and beneficiary’s 
address, in €
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Per capita
per year
Croatia 0,00 0,00 57.799,00 463.364,28 9.970,00 468.410,00  0,06
Bosnia-Herz. 0,00 0,00 12.355.352,51 22.177.891,41 14.951.139,42 33.703.303,00  5,42
Serbia 0,00 0,00 105.285.307,49 43.370.788,69 70.653.614,03 44.422.722,00  9,17
Montenegro 0,00 0,00 2.607.774,10 6.818.164,78 4.645.786,32 5.869.374,00  7,97
Kosovo 0,00 0,00 11.144.039,20 17.903.618,26 20.912.442,72 14.627.826,00  9,31
Albania 0,00 0,00 11.424.329,52 15.653.525,06 18.591.966,92 18.316.721,00  5,67
Macedonia 0,00 0,00 3.498.757,62 7.344.285,33 1.758.057,23 3.257.852,00  1,93
Average  5,37
Source: author’s elaboration from European Commission, Financial Transparency Service database
Vol.XV
III, N
o. 66 - 2012
XIX (68) - 2013
88
Bibliography:
Bache, I. (2010) ‘Europeanization and multi-level governance: EU cohesion 
policy and pre accession aid in Southeast Europe’, Southeast 
European and Black Sea Studies, Vol.10, No.1, pp. 1-12.
Blockmans, S. (2007) Tough Love. The European Union’s relation with the 
Western Balkans. The Hague: T.M.C. Asser.
Börzel, T. (2013) ‘When Europeanization hits limited statehood: the Western 
Balkans as a test case for the transformative power of Europe, in 
Elbasani A. (ed) European Integration and Transformation in the 
Western Balkans. Europeanization or Business as Usual?. London: 
Routledge, pp. 173-184.
Börzel, T. and Risse, T. (2003) ‘Conceptualizing Domestic Impact of 
Europe’, in Featherstone K. and Radaelli, C. (eds.) The Politics of 
Europeanization. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 55-78.
Denti, D. (2011) Building Member States? The EU’s Instrument for Pre-
Accession Assistance for the Western Balkan Countries, Master’s 
thesis in European Interdisciplinary Studies (unpublished), Bruges/
Natolin: College of Europe.
Elbasani, A. (2013) ‘Europeanization travels to the Western Balkans: 
enlargement strategy, domestic obstacles and diverging reforms’, 
in Elbasani A. (ed) European Integration and Transformation in the 
Western Balkans. Europeanization or Business as Usual?. London: 
Routledge, pp. 3-21.
Europa.eu, Financial Transparency System database, http://ec.europa.
eu/beneficiaries/fts/ index_en.htm, accessed 30 March 2013
European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament of 14 October 2009 - Instrument 
for pre-accession assistance (IPA) - Multi-annual indicative financial 




o. 66 - 2012
XIX (68) - 2013
89
European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament of 5 November 2008 
- Instrument for pre-accession assistance (IPA) multi-annual 
indicative financial framework for 2010-2012 [COM(2008) 705 final – 
Not published in the Official Journal].
European Commission , Commission Regulation (EC) No 718/2007 of 12 
June 2007 implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 1085/2006 
establishing an instrument for pre-accession assistance (IPA) 
[Official Journal L 170 of 29.06.2007].
European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document - 
Background document accompanying the document Report 
from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and 
the European Economic and Social Committee of 20 November 
2012 - 2011 Annual Report on Financial Assistance for Enlargement 
(IPA, PHARE, CARDS, Turkey Pre-Accession Instrument, Transition 
Facility) [COM(2012) 678 final - Not published in the Official Journal] 
{SWD(2012) 385 final}.
European Commission , Report from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social 
Committee of 11 October 2011 - 2010 Annual Report on Financial 
Assistance for Enlargement (IPA, PHARE, CARDS, Turkey Pre-
accession Instrument, Transition Facility) [COM(2011) 647 final - Not 
published in the Official Journal] {SEC(2011) 1198 final}.
European Commission, Report from the Commission to the Council, the 
European Parliament and the European Economic and Social 
Committee of 25 November 2010 - 2009 Annual Report on the 
implementation of the instrument for pre-accession assistance (IPA) 
[COM(2010) 687 final – Not published in the Official Journal].
European Commission, Report from the Commission to the Council, the 
European Parliament and the European Economic and Social 
Committee of 23 December 2009 - 2008 Annual Report on the 
implementation of the instrument for pre-accession assistance (IPA) 
[COM(2009) 699 final – Not published in the Official Journal].
Vol.XV
III, N
o. 66 - 2012
XIX (68) - 2013
90
European Commission, Report from the Commission to the Council, the 
European Parliament and the European Economic and Social 
Committee of 15 December 2008 – 2007 Annual IPA Report 
[COM(2008) 850 final – Not published in the Official Journal].
European Stability Initiative – ESI (2005) Breaking out of the Balkan Ghetto: 
Why IPA should be changed, Berlin, pp. 1-12, http://www.esiweb.
org/pdf/esi_document_id_66.pdf, accessed 30 March 2013
Graziano, P. and Vink, M. P. (2008) Europeanization: New Research 
Agendas, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 3-20.
Mink, G. and Bonnard, P. (2010) Le passé au Présent. Gisements Mémoriels 
et Actions Publiques en Europe Centrale et Orientale. Paris: Michel 
Houdiard.
Mojsovska, S. (2010) ‘Western Balkans’ accession to the EU: a need for (re)
tailoring of the EU assistance instruments’, Europesworld.org, http://
www.europesworld.org/ NewEnglish/Home_old/CommunityPosts/
tabid/809/PostID/2077/
Mrak, M. and Tilev, D. (2008) Absorption for EU pre-accession funds: 
concept and implications for Kosovo, Pristina: Forumi2015-KCSF, 
pp. 1-73.
Radaelli C. (2000) ‘Whither Europeanization? Concept stretching and 
substantive change’, European Integration online Papers, Vol.4, 
No.8, 2000, http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-008a.htm, accessed 
30 March 2013.
Ramel S. (2011) ‘The Role of the European Union in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Neither a Model, nor a Hegemon?’, Transitions, Vol. 51, pp. 269-287.
Schimmelfennig, F. and Ulrich Sedelmeier, U. (2005) The Europeanization 
of Central and Eastern Europe. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Schimmelfennig, F. (2008) ‘EU political accession conditionality after 
the 2004 enlargement: consistency and effectiveness’, Journal of 
European Public Policy, Vol. 15, No. 6, pp. 918-937.
Sierhej R. (2007) ‘EU funds: what can the Western Balkans learn from the 
New Member States (NMS)?’, presentation, Warsaw: International 
Monetary Fund regional office, October 2007.
Vol.XV
III, N
o. 66 - 2012
XIX (68) - 2013
91
Szemlér, T. (2008) “EU Financial Support for the Western-Balkans: Well-Suited 
to Real Needs?”, in Using IPA And Other EU Funds To Accelerate 
Convergence And Integration In The Western-Balkans, Budapest: 
Central European University-ENS, 2008, web.ceu.hu/cens/assets/
files/IPA.pdf, accessed 30 March 2013.
Tatham, A. F. (2009) Enlargement of the European Union. Alphen aan de 
Rijn: Kluwer Law International.
Van Bork, G. (2011), ‘Introduction to Cohesion Policy, IPA, and Project 
Cycle Management’, Ecorys PCM Training, Ankara, 1-11 February 
2011.
Wallace, H. (2000), ‘EU Enlargement: a Neglected Subject’, in Green 
Cowles, M. and Smith, M. (eds.), Risk, Reforms, Resistance, and 
Revival (The State of the European Union), Vol. 5, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 149-163.
Davide Denti is a PhD student at the School of International 
Studies, University of Trento, Italy. He holds Masters degrees in 
European Studies (College of Europe, 2011) and in International 
Relations (University of Milan, 2008). He worked as academic 
assistant at the College of Europe (Bruges, Belgium, 2012), 
and as programme assistant for development projects (DR 
Congo, 2010). His research focuses on the EU enlargement to 
the Western Balkans and the Europeanisation of candidate 
countries. He recently contributed to an edited volume on 
public apologies and on the political use of past memories.
